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Abstract: The causes for the contradicting Soviet and British views on the
Serbian existential situation from 1941-1945 stem from Austria-Hungary' s
policy and the ideological heritage of the Comintem and Stalinism. Though
the war in Yugoslavia displayed anti-Serbianism from the occupier and
Quislings alike, the allies saw the cause for anti-Serbianism in the old "he-
gemony" or old unsymmetric Serbo-Croat positions. blind to the fact that
the occupational reign of terror had been imposed only upon the Serbs. This
resulted in the discreditation of the national dimension of Serbian resistance
under Gen. Mihailovic and the rise to power of Tito' s anti-Serbian and anti-
Yugoslav regime.
The ideological dividing line between British and Soviet policy in
the inter-war period was determined by the 1917 overthrow of state
and revol ution in Russia. Henceforward, old imperial rivalries and con-
flicts gained impetus, influencing both bilateral and multilateral rela-
tions between the two powers. One of the results of these conflicts was
an unhindered consolidation of Nazi policy in Hitler's Germany, giv-
ing capitulatory expression in the Munich dictate of 1938 and Stalin's
rival response with the Ribentrop-Molotov accord of 1939.
In the inter-war period, neither of the two were an important eco-
nomic partner to Yugoslavia, and judging by later developments in
war, neither was ready for such a partnership.
After the World War I aliiance, Britain gave France, and then
Germany, priority in trade during the years preceding World War II. In
broader circles, particularly Serbian, Fngland left the impression of an
indifferent partner that did not display much understanding for Serbia's
national, state and legal constituting, thereby objectively helping large
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parts of the nation to become assimilative raw material for the expan-
sion of several neighboring nations.
Soviet Russia, in a new world of ideas, did not favor anyone who
stood in the way of her ideological ecstasy, particularly not the Yugo-
slav regime, which actively supported the numerous White Guard
group, helping to organize anti-Bolshevic activities.
Both powers did not apprehend the essence of Yugoslav socio-po-
Iitical, and particularly national relationships. They reasoned on the ba-
sis of notions formed by constituted and consolidated nations or by
unilateral ideological grounds.
Serbo-Croat differences and conflicts since the beginning of the
existence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes centered on
the national problem, a problem of the "Greater Serbian oppression of
other nations". This "bogey of Greater Serbianism" became on the
world scene a landmark for political relationships toward Yugoslavia
and a curtain for different forms of manipulation detrimental to the Yu-
goslav nations, above all the Serbs. Forces of Austro-Hungarian nostal-
gia and sentimentalism always stressed Serb political preponderance in
the leadership, raising it to irreal proportions. This served to encourage
schemers to anti-Serbianism and anti-Yugoslavism, and those whose
chief goal was to destroy the Yugoslav state.
The young Communist Party of Yugoslavia entered into every al-
liance after the mid-20s, even with the extreme right, in the fight
against "Greater Serbian hegemony", Thanks to Yugoslav communists
and individuals from other groups, this concoction, fabricated in the
old Austro-Hungarian kitchen, entered the Comintem and Soviet gov-
ernment, crucially affecting the forming of Soviet politics. Thus the
Soviet Union viewed relations with Yugoslavia not on the basis of tra-
dition, but political propagandistic fiction. The old postulates of Rus-
sian politics toward fellow Orthodox Serbs dissolved, enabling various
projectors of Serbian destruction to sneak in the void.
On the level of emotion and volition of the Serbian people, these
relations assumed defeatist expressions from the beginning, in keeping
with the intentions of the social wave, lifted with the October Revolu-
tion in Russia. After this, the relationship toward the Slavic and Social-
ist Mother became a corrective for differentiating "conservatism" and
"avant-gardism", and from disuniting so-called "Greater Serbian he-
gemony" from the "progressive projections of a federal reconstruction
of Yugoslavia". The latter rested on rather romanticized and abstract
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visions of national equality, launched chiefly by Croatian political cen-
ters. The right to citizenship in such a situation was granted to Serb
and separatist groups, with absolutizations of regional peculiarities, be-
cause they were backed by a big power, which provided their schemes
with particular ethnic, cultural and historical traits, even the character
of "new nations". These schemes assumed clear expression during
World War II, when on their foundations were built the federative con-
structions of AVNOJ (National Anti-fascist Liberation Council of Yu-
goslavia).
Visions of Serbo-Croat relations perceived by Stalin and the
Comintern were dispersed throughout the world via international com-
mumst channels, forming a manipulative "public opinion".
Here lie the sources of Britain's and Soviet pre-war and war pol-
icy toward Yugoslavia. Observation of the country's problem of Insta-
bility as a result of the relationship between the "oppressive" Serbian
and "oppressed" Croatian nations, was WIth the Soviets accompanied
by associative illusions, that a "counterpart to old Russian autocracy"
was the issue, and with the British, associations resembling a "Yugo-
slav Belfast". Certain quarters were even understanding about the anti-
Serbian actions, as in their defense was "Serbian hegemony".
Ignorance of Yugoslavia's ethnic, religious, cultural and historical situ-
ation was profound; notions of Serbs and Croats as nations differing
widely prevailed everywhere. Britain was in this respect best "repre-
, sented" by Robert Seton-Watson, whose views met all Croatian de-
mands at the account of Serbs.' SOVIet delusions about Serbia's
position in Yugoslavia were a common stand that determmed the po-
litical behavior of the Krernlin.?
The starting positions of the British and Soviet policies toward
Yugoslavia differed considerably in the war, as did their long-term aims.
The Soviet Union established its orientation on class and ideological
bases, seeking and finding levers for its implementation in the Commu-
nist Party of Yugoslavia, as an organization that fed on such sources.
The link with British policy was a stand that presupposed uncompro-
mising combativeness to all reasons, as the universal war logic, and to
ideological and class motives. A political platform was built on this
R W. Set01\ Watson i Jugosloveni, correspondence from 1918-194l.Z..agreb University -
Institute for Croatian Hist)I)' - British Academy, Zagreb-London, 1976.
2 1. Levin, Nacionaljni] vopros v poslevoenojJugoslavii, Moscow, 1934.
204 Vese1in Djuretic
mutual interest, determining the fate of the warring factions in Yugo-
slavia.
Churchill's government saw clearly the advantage of the Serbs in
the protest and rebellion of march 1941, but not clearly enough the role
of national contradictions in the rapid downfall in April. It perceived
the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as part of the
occupational system to destroy Yugoslavia as a state (into zones of in-
fluence), and unequivocably condemned it. The U.S. adminstration
held the same position. Croatia's illusions of independence were
viewed with understanding in late 1941 and first half of 1942. That
was when old nationalist disputes reemerged on the political stage of
the Yugoslav Royal Government, in response to news of the Ustasha
genocide against Serbs, claiming already hundreds of thousands of
lives.
The Soviet Union encouraged and supported every anti-fascist
sentiment in Yugoslavia even before the war, and dunng the March re-
bellion and April war, propagandi stically, as a mitigation of its own
positions. It did not, however, perceive the true character of inter-war
national contradictions, nor the true character of their effects in the
war. Russian foreign ministry documents bespeak that certain organs
of Stalin's government knew this, knew what was going on in Yugo-
slavia during the war, but the majority confirmed old Comintern no-
tions of "Greater Serbian hegernony't' However, there is a vagueness
as to how the deceptions on "hegemony" effected certain post-April
political vicissitudes: in regard to the Royal government and regarding
hesitations within the leadership of the Communist Party of Croatia.
Though the fact that the policy of restoring Yugoslavia's independence
and territorial integrity was accepted in the Kremlin since early June
1941 evinces that the hesitation, if there had been any in the past
month and a half, was overcome.
Churchill's government was pushed in the rear of Soviet politics
when the former was convinced it held firmly all the reins of the Yugo-
slav anti-fascist movement. The "legitimistic" principle to which all
the allies took an oath lent it the most favored role. Britain held the
chief outposts of Yugoslav legitimism - the King and royal govern-
ment. It reacted with jealousy at any sign that the U.S. might seize this
"advantage". Churchill's government believed it secured through this
3 Arhiv vnesnej po1itiki SSSR, f. 144, op.3, p.4, d.?, pp 31-36, 130-146~ op. 3a.d.2,
pp 130-146.
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"legitimism" full control over the Chetnik movement and its com-
mander, which was understandable, as Mihailovic had on joining the
royal government linked his destiny to the government and king.
Soviet respect for Yugoslav legitimism, demonstrated in regular
diplomatic relations and efforts to put "Titos partisans" under the
command of the "more seasoned and prepared officer" was deceitful.
Near the end of 1941, after the insurgent rift and abandonment of Ser-
bia, and first half of 1942, it seemed the partisans had forever disap-
peared from the political scene. They had abandoned the alliance as an
option as well. Mention of them was made in London by Chetniks in
harsh public criticisms of their "leftist" activities in Montenegro, Her-
zegovina, eastern Bosnia and Serbia, WIth long lists of Serbian nation-
alists brutally exterminated.
Ali indications were that Churchill's government held the main
levers of Yugoslav policy. Owing to an extorted pacification of nation-
alist passions In Jovanovic's government (which in 1942 replaced 5i-
movie's) a theoretical symmetry of Serbo-Croat war positions was
established, which helped push aside Croatian pro-fascist layers. HSS
leader Vlatko Macek was seen as a counterpart to Mihailovic, at a time
when the Croatian leader had no troops for combat.
This theoretical symmetry became propagandist reality, a basis
for building a fictive alliance policy toward Yugoslavia. In the shadow
of this fiction was a media war among emigrants, waged with such fe-
rocity that the allies were more preoccupied with this battle than with
the war that raged on battlefields throughout Yugoslavia. In the propa-
gandist war, the Serbs were losers a priori, having no ally to sympa-
thize with them and deliberate concrete notions of their existential
reality. In the country, they were tom between Orthodox and Slavic
Russia and the communist USSR. Outside, between western superfici-
ality and a theoretic orientation for a future Yugoslavia which ignored
their sufferings and countless sacrifices, and the tragic national reality
that was becoming disastrous. Thus the Serbs were stretched upon a
moral crossroads. Dexterous artisans of the Croatian political scene -
"invisible" externally but visible in the government and in emigration,
incited trouble daily and ironically provoked the Serbs, in light of their
onentation for a future with the allies, exhibiting their national and
4 Veselin Diuretic, Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama I-II, fourth edition,
supplemented, Belgrade, 190,2.
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tragic preoccupations as a plea to continue with the old "hegemonic"
policy and an obvious resistance to the "general demands"."
Mihailovic had lost months and years proving that his (Serbian)
struggle was conditioned on numerous dangers; he provided numerous
bloody testimonies conducive to this. Nothing helped. Tito denied it
all, with claims of his fighting spirit, his victories in combat, which
were, indeed, considerably magnified, but nevertheless, always evi-
dent. Perfunctory Churchill took them seriously. At one point he lent
an ear to Serb suffering - apparently with compassion - but always re-
membering to add a bellicose tutoring that considered the overall scene
of the allies.
Mihailovics men defended themselves with the charges of a per-
fidious Albion, without taking any steps to rupture the relationship.
They never even thought of breaking from "their" royal government,
not even when the latter had entered the orbit of allied reasoning about
Yugoslav reality. Not even when it was showered with political "ex-
pertise" marked by a symmetry of Serbo-Croatian positions, that is,
levelling the instigator and victim. Mihailovics political center clung
to the young and inexperienced king, though he had obviously become
a symbol of a fettered governmental policy. It never occurred to him to
set up his own government in the country, an independent political
center that would present authentic Serbian interests to the world. The
Chetnik political center thus sank into a rift between certain Serbian
motives and interests of Yugoslav policy and its government, which
had during the idle maneuvering objectively conducted a policy of Ser-
bian neutralization, enabling at the end the regrouping of its domesitc
foes to the winning side.
The cul-de-sac of Mihailovic's policy was marked in mid-1942. It
was disclosed by Soviet propagandist actions on the line of discredit-
ing the Chetnik leader. Many of Tito ' s reports had reached Moscow in
the first half of 1942, which, by disregarding Serbian war reality on the
level of Yugoslavism, strengthened allied theoretical judgments and
projections of a future Yugoslav community. They were fatal to Mi-
hailovic because they created illusions, before semi-literate allies indif-
ferent to the Serbian situation, that an armed struggle in Yugoslavia
was possible, despite the difficult conditions.
The principle of combativeness became by the end of 1941 the
only criterion for solidarity toward the allies. During the brief period of
the joint partisan-Chetnik struggle from September to November 1941,
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both left the impression abroad that a struggle against the occupier was
possible. Then they disowned initial beliefs by many, even the Yugo-
slav and British governments, that time was not ripe for such an action.
Churchill's government saw neither then no later the revolutionary im-
plication in the principle of combativeness, that the Comintern and
Stalin were creating a political platform for the international recogni-
tion of Yugoslav forces under communist leadership, that it was a
moral curtain for seizing power via revolution.
It appears, however, that the Soviet government in mid-1942
viewed uncompromising combativeness from a purely communist an-
gle, when the mortal danger in the battle for Moscow had ceased. Until
then it was governed more by military and political realism, expecting
backing from Britam anywhere in Europe, even in the Balkans. On the
line of realism then was the call for single command in the resistance
movement under Mihailovic. The Kremlin had due to international rea-
sons avoided direct attacks on Chetnik commanders until rnid-1942,
when it set out to discredit them, by stressing the contribution to the
war by the partisans and publishing reports by "neutral" media to the
effect that Mihailovic was obstructing the partisan struggle with his co-
operation with the occupier.
Britain's apprehension of the principle of combativeness departed
from purely war motives, varying around combat tactics. Thus the For-
eign Office and the War Cabinet on Yugoslavia had exchanged encour-
aging and defeatistic instructions in their reasonings. And when it
perceived ideological differences and clashes among the Serbian anti-
fascist parties, and suspected Soviet influence on the bahavior of the
communists, it did not infer on the level of analysis the phenomenon of
"new socialist revolutions". It saw them as a reality only within an
analysis of Soviet reality until the war.5
Relations in the anti-Hitler coalition presupposed all combat rea-
sons to ideological ones, whereas British playing host to the Yugoslav
royal government posed a particular obstacle for Churchill, because of
the discussions about Serbian national and existential problems which
persistently disrupted the Yugoslav government throughout the war.
To all its cabinets - under Sirnovic, Jovanovic, Trifunovic and Puric -
the issue was not to allow the opening of another front of Serbian suf-
fering. The issue was not the usual fro-it. determined by the mere alter-
5 Stanisa R. Vlahovic, Zbornik dokumenata iz britanske arhive, Anglo-jugoslovenski
odnosi 1941-1948, Birmingham 1985,57-167.
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native for or against the occupier, but a front that would on an anti-oc-
cupier basis express two different tactics of struggle - one without
compromise (partisan) and the other mainly compromising (Chetnik).
In implementing its patronage over the Yugoslav royal govern-
ment, London took care of its protege in relations within the great coa-
lition. It did so rather unknowingly: it adjusted the Yugoslav refugee
center to the overall coalition reasons, forcing it to push its national
reasons behind those of the allies. It thus triggered opposition in
mainly Serbian agents in the government, who, owing to persisting Us-
tasha pogroms and German retaliation were governed chiefly by na-
tional motives. The royal center thus dictated a policy of perpetual
maneuvering, adjusting to Churchull's unstable policy, instructing its
forces in the country (the Chetniks) to consider national circumstances
and relationships among the allies. But this course, after the rupture of
the anti-fascist forces during the severe partisan-Chetnik conflict, was
bound to lead to many trials, inconsistencies, compromising both cen-
ters. The other side in the conflict (partisans) expediently presented its
foes' making conditional any struggle with Serbian existential reasons
as an obvious sabotage of the anti-fascist struggle, thus compromising
rare sentiments among some London officials concerning the Serbian
tragedy, rendering them an anti-Soviet character. The British govern-
ment was thus in a situation proving its solidarity to the allies before
the Soviets, with new tutorial instructions to the Yugoslav pawns: to
heed their behavior and not spoil relations in the anti-Hitler coalition.
Clever Croatian agents in the Yugoslav government and emigra-
tion offices in the United States, confronted with Pavelic's "anational"
policy and its destructive effects (particularly in Dalmatia), were expe-
dient in Britain's ignorant maneuvering to discredit the Serbian Chet-
niks as a new Greater Serbian center prescient of a bloody revenge.
From these circles, that is, from the circles of their back-stage patrons,
national symmetries were launched, gradually winning recognition, so
that Pavelic' s racist, genocidal collaborationism was equated with
Nedic's clerical collaborationism in the name of "saving the Father-
land", although the latter was a necessary mediator between the occu-
pier and threatened populace. Anti-Serb circles were thus able to
present Mihailovic's tactical and political agreement as a groundless
capitulation, even mark it as an ideological yoke; to successfully con-
ceal the fact that it was based on the anti-communism aimed at the "in-
stigators" of German reprisals against Serbs and on anti-extremism,
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determined by cnmes perpetrated by communists in Montenegro, Her-
zegovina, and, on a smaller scale, in other Serbian regions. This rela-
tionship on the level of propaganda assumed pronounced ideological
postulates, where domestic subjectivistic deviations were linked to
Stalinistic ones, which raised wide anti-communist sentiment through-
out the country. The allies viewed it as a sectarian policy that threat-
ened to jeopardize the coalition with the Soviet Union. Because of this
"danger", Churchill's Yugoslav policy increasingly resembled Stalin's,
which was most apparent in propaganda. News supplied by Tito or the
Comintern were casually published in western media, and then taken
over by Moscow to be presented to the international public as the
"voice of the Soviet public opinion". This deft "revolutionary" game
would not have been possible without good coordination with the par-
tisan center in Yugoslavia. In the background, Tito played his pro-
Croatian game with Stalin.
Croatian nationalist agents in Britain and the United States used
the blind alleys of Serbian maneuvenng to enter the political course
conducted by the allies which enabled them to omit the past and Ser-
bian war reality filled with nationalist challenges aimed against the en-
tire Croatian populace, and tum all forces toward a "Yugoslav future"
Individuals that had until then openly expressed chauvinistic affili-
ations (such as KInJevic) also took part in these aspirations, which pro-
vided an opportunity to occupy a position closer to the policy
conducted by the great allies than that of Serbian centers at home and
in emigration They even approached the Soviet policy fur which they
had until then, owing to ideological and religious (Catholics) motives,
felt much enmity. They also adjusted mto the wave of sentimentalism
that rose throughout the western world on account of Russia's immeas-
urable suffering. Arid the triumphs at Moscow and Stalingrad, as well
as the one of pan-Slavic character skillfully conducted by communist
media in the western world (for insta....tee, the Canadian paper Free
Word). It created gradually a SOCIal atmosphere for the recognition of
Sovietism. The chief message of the clime to the Yugoslav warring
parties was: a demand for national unity toward a common future, a
message that SUIted the main political stream of the anti-Hitler coali-
tion. Even pro-Croatian centers, the Vatican above all, which sought
ways to save the Croatian people frcrn possible Serb retaliation and
convey them to the \\!1lli'1C)"'S side."
G Veselin Diuretic Vladu 110 .'1j,.", ...l/ second edition. Belgrade 19R3. 3i-10!
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In this way, a large part of the Serbian emigration, mostly those in
the United States and Canada, were in a different position from the al-
lies. Trust in the widely condemned forces of Mihailovic diminished
among a part of the emigration, owing somewhat to solidarity with
their new fatherland, and to patriotic and pro-Russian sentiment, with
increasing inclination toward the partisans. Imbibing the muddy
springs of national tragedy, flowing perpetually with varying intensity,
becoming a real prisoner of the narrow national policy, the first part
became at the same time a suitable target for propagandist games
which pushed it cunningly in the anti-alliance group, that is, opposed it
to the broad commitment for the reconstruction of the new Yugoslav
community.
The position and behavior of the Yugoslav emigration presented
an important corrective for the forming of the British and American
public opinion and, under that influence, the official policy of these
countries. Well aware of the prevailing sentiment, the Soviet govern-
ment (through the Comintern and other intelligence posts in the west-
ern world) regularly used the propagandistic and political impulses of
this "public opinion" to earn recognition for its communist strategy.
Especially its policy toward Yugoslavia, which was conducted through
its Communist Party. It performed these activities in a manner that re-
cent history will record as one of the most original revolutionary and
political tactics. Continually stimulating the partisans to uncompromis-
ing combativeness, it followed the common orientation of the allies. At
one point so provokingly that the foes of the Yugoslav communists
were by the force of circumstance persistently put to trial and thrown
off course - to the position of military and political defeatism. Stalin's
regime ignored the Serbian reasons, thus compelling the Serbs with ad-
ditional provocations to prove their sufferings before the Soviets and
offer ideological proof before the western allies. However, the world
was benumbed owing to various tricks, doubting Serbian judgements,
and western allies had long presupposed their ideological reasons to
those of combat.
The strategy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, inspired by
Moscow, together with Tito's leadership, had new possibilities for con-
tinuing at the end of 1941 its course to win acclaim for the revolution-
ary forces, assisted by their Yugoslav foes, and with help from a
"leftist" and otherwise influenced Yugoslavized public opinion: finally,
with the help of westem governments, above all Churchill's, which at
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the time demanded Yugoslav politics wihout any of her national-suf-
fering conditions.
Britain's "expertise preparation" considerably helped unhindered
movement along this course with its sociologizing about Balkan social
strutures as unfit for introducing communism. This enabled partisan
forces to hide their true ideological face, and, subsequently, with help
from the broad headline "national-liberation forces of Yugoslavia", to
impose themselves as the only counter-balance to the Serbo-Croatian
national obscurity. Particularly as a counter-balance to the movement
of Draza Mihailovic, who was charged as the true successor of the "old
Greater Serbian hegemony and oppression", alleging that a "retaliatory
movement", not a liberation, was at stake, which was resisting the Yu-
goslav policy of the emigrants and allies.
Thanks to Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda, Chetnik ideological
proof before the West became increasingly the only ideological and
provocative position in Yugoslavia that disturbed joint combat efforts.
The partisan demonstration before their own centerand ally, consider-
ing it had been since the beginning successfully concealed from the
westem world, hidden beneath institutional, personal and other sym-
bols, which presented it in the broadest democratic sense, it was out-
side the light of the international scene. Ignorance of this fact enabled
that the Chetniks' account of Yugoslav communism as "extremism"
were unconvincing, because they were not backed by the uncompro-
mising combativeness of the partisans, and they were also unaccept-
able because they disturbed relations with the eastern partner who bore
the chief burden of the war. Thus they fell into a fresh rift in which
emerged old suspicions of individual western politicians toward Serbs
as the "Russian stronghold" and Soviet neglect of Serbian narrow-na-
tional motives. It was a state of fatal dilemmas, inevitably leading to
new divisions and conflicts.
Mystifications of the partisan ideological position were an over-
ture to international eli screditation of the Chetniks and international
recognition of the partisan movement. The latter emerged as the sole
winner of the differences and conflicts between the narrow-Serbian na-
tional and existential reasons and the policy of the allies. Its true fight-
ing spirit and assertive readiness to accept every anti-fascist demand
by the allies, regardless of Serbian national circumstances, entered the
domestic and world propagandist orbit as the only real anti-fascist and
Yugoslav position. After glorious victories by the allies and Italy's cc-
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pitulation, such propaganda in the country encouraged new differentia-
tion - within a victorious atmosphere, and a sobering down for all peo-
ple and nations, for those who had owing to various manipulations by
leaderships and foreign factors been cast on the profascist side. The
epilogue of the process was the exit of most Croats and Muslims from
the net of Pavelic's pernicious politics: a neutralization of Yugoslav
national minority leaderships (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Hungarians),
drawing these people out from the net of anti-Serbian policy. The na-
tional-liberation (partisan) movement emerged as a God-given haven
for all those seduced, for their anti-occupier last-moment activation.
The new division among the Serbian people, spurred by the glori-
ous allied victories and their pro-partisan policy, was much more com-
plex than the insurgent one. From the moral standpomt above all:
demands for turning toward the future were seen by most as a new pro-
vocatory policy. Living with tragic memories of hundreds of thousands
of innocent victims. they looked more toward the past than the future,
or beheld the future with the eyes of an embittered avenger. They saw
the propagandistic discrediting of Mihailovics movement as a broad
anti-Serbian conspiracy, and expressed their caustic political obstinacy
in condemning the British and Soviet policy, rather than the occu-
pier's. This obstinacy led to new existential and tactical yokes with the
retreating Germans, motivated by anti-communist and anti-British sen-
timent, whereby the adversary propaganda won new trumps to present
Chetniks as traitors to the world. This was the road to new Serbian tri-
als and tragedy. Other Serbs followed the path of political realism of-
fered by the allies, partiularly the Russian bellicose wave moving
irrepressibly toward the Balkans. One part, resenting Churchill's pol-
icy, turned toward the future, led by faith in the great American civili-
zation and democracy, or belief in the resurrection of staggering
France. Most of the people, however, were convinced that the tradi-
tional dimension of a dozing Russia would finally speak out in direct
encounter with Serbian reality. By accepting the national liberation
partisan movement already recognized by the allies, they saw the only
framework for regrouping, that IS, an opportunity to win freedom with
uncompromising engagement in combat, awaiting an end to the war on
the "right side". The Russian factor, in connection with the socialist
ideology, which became more openly and widely manifest on the plat-
form of the partisan movement, acquired euphoric strength, winning
over the "small" man. Its old insurgent anti-communist, as an anti-ex-
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tremist sentiment, dissolved before proof of unusual social mobility,
which the partisan movement then displayed widely, including in its
political and military orbit more common folk - workers and peasants.
They became to their fellow countrymen symbols of national revolu-
tion and a new socialist era that would ensue.
The Yugoslav "compromise", expressed in the Tito-SubaSic
agreement in mid-I 944, was thus prepared, with a series of actions of
the forces of revolutionary orientation. "Compromise" boiled down to
the basic war structure - over the principle of combativeness as the cri-
terion for all values. All political forces that were prisoners of narrow
national motives and objectives became antipodal to the overall policy
of the allies, and as such bound to fail. The Yugoslav "compromise"
was proof that Serbian national peculiarities were being somewhat re-
spected, those that were conducive to the pro-cornmurust part of the
populace. But this would not have been possible had there not been a
major crossover of Serbs near the end of the war to Titos side (which
the" compromise" had hastened). It would not have been possible with-
out the policy of the USSR and the western allies who backed these
forces and appeared as guarantees of the new Yugoslavia - "in wich
full equality of all its nations was warranted"
Churchill's government, under the illusions that it was the chief
creator of the compromise. dosed its Yugoslav war policy with new il-
lusions. In putting Titos forces under the command of King Petar II, it
found a formula for an "uncommunist'' outcome, without realizing the
character of the revolutionary dimension of Yugoslav reality, its firm
link with the center In Moscow. It did not see the role of the revolu-
tionary forces in steering Churchill to such a policy, which put all Yu-
goslav streams and movements Into fatal alternatives: cling to the old
positions and disappear with the occupier or accept Churchill's" com-
promise" which lent wide support to the new Yugoslav political center
of socialist orientation and iIS international recognition on the basis of
state and lawful legitimism.
Only after the fait accompli, after the penetration of Soviet forces
on Serbian soil, Britain became aware of the fact that the compromise
it had backed was merely an incorporate Soviet revolutionary strategy.
The U.S. received evident confirmation of its stands, but, respect-
ing the partner supremacy in the Mediterranean - did nothing to reverse
the course of events.
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Churchill's government was scarcely aware that the engagement
of Ivan Subasic was only an acceptance of the non-Serbian path to-
ward "resolving" the Serbian problem, and that, by "employing" the
young king in the course of talks with Tito was the realization of
Stalin's plan to "somehow trick" England, in order to disarm, with help
from the "center of unity", its troops, the Chetniks, who were the real
rival to the partisan movement.
When Churchill's government became aware of their delusions,
prior to the outcome, it did not even attempt to carry out essentail poli-
tial corrections: on the contrary, it quickened its step towards its naive
vision of the" compromise". Confronted with the Soviet fait accompli,
there was realistically no hope for such a reverse twist.
Nevertheless, the British government continued to express its lack
of understanding for the particular Stalinist aspect of "democracy" es-
pecially expressed in its faith and hope that the Yugoslav peoples
would annul all that had been accomplished thus far in a plebiscitary
manner, considerably and with her military and political help. It con-
tinued to believe in that possibility even during the Potsdam confer-
ence.
COBJETCKO 11EPI1T AHCKO 11rHOP11CAJDE CPIICKE
E311CTEHIJ,11J3JIHE IIOITI1T11KE
Pe3HMe
Arpecnja HeMaqKIIX HaU;UCTa U I1TaJIlljaHcKIIX rpamncra na JyrOCJIaBlIjy
norahana je y npBOM peA)' Cpncxn napon, IIpOTIIB Cp6a cy oxynaropn noxpe-
nyJIU CBe HaU;HOHaJIHe n MaIbUHCKe cenapa'rncre, y npBOM pe)l,y Xpaare. Ycne-
)l,llOje crpauran renomm,
Cp6n cy 6UJIU yrpcosean xao napon n xao napon cy 6I1Jlu06aBe3HH )l,ace
fipaae. Crora je KO)l, IbIIX nojasa U)l,eOJIOIIIKOr llUHlIou;a, KOMyHlIcTa, )l,0qeKaHa
xao ynap )l,eCTpYKIJ;IIje caMoo)l,6paM6eHe xoxeanje napona xao ornpan.e jom
jenner rpponra npOTIIB Cp6a. To j e nocefiao nOCTaJIO jacno nOCJIe Hau;nOHaJI-
I1CTnllKOr (neraasxor) fiopfienor excnonapaa,a, sajenno ca KOMYHIICTlIMa
(napraaaaaaa).
Cypona nexranxa 0)l,Ma3)l,a Ha)l, Hap0)l,OM nCTaKJIa je y npnn nrraa
nOJIHTIPIII MOTIIB ocsajaua -)l,0 60JbIIX )l,aHa. 113an.e je crajao napon,
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AlII caBC3HIIlJ,IL COBjCTII II I3pIlTaHI~II. IIOHCCCHII IIpBIIM 60p6eHlIM yc-
rrecnsra "Jyrocrronena " nncy BIlJl,e,lIl ocnonno - na cy penpecanuje (100 sa jen-
nor) YCJ10BibaBaJIC CBaKO cpncxo nonaurau.e, a 60p6enoM rronatnaa.y JJ;aBaJIe
cxrncao rraunona.tne neoJ~roBopIloCTII. Tlponarannanxr nyTe~1 6Imc cy
CTBOpCHC onTmlailIICTIPIKC BIl3IIje caryanujc II TO nOJJ; yrnnajei« CTaJbHHCKO-
TIITOBCKC nporraraane. I1nY3I1JC 0 xrorybnocm 60p6e. xoje cy rrrnopacane
cpnCKO crpauan,e. nocrane cy 0JJ;peJJ;HlJ,3 caBe3HII'IKe rrornrrnxe npexra 'f HOBOj
JyrOCJIaBIIjH". Ilpexo IhIlX KOMyHIICTII (KTIJ) cryrmnn cy na jyrocaonencxy n
MebynapoJJ;ny cneny.
